Greg Detre
Sunday, 12 May, 2002
"In
all things, therefore, where we have clear evidence from our ideas, and those
principles of knowledge I have above mentioned, reason is the proper judge; and
revelation, though it may, in consenting with it, confirm its dictates, yet
cannot in such cases invalidate its decrees: nor can we be obliged, where we
have the clear and evident sentience of reason, to quit it for the contrary
opinion, under a pretence that it is matter of faith: which can have no
authority against the plain and clear dictates of reason."
�[Idea] being that term
which, I think, best serves to stand for whatsoever is the object of
understanding when a man thinks, I have used it to express whatever is meant by
phantasm, notion, species, or whatever it is which the mind can be
employed about in thinking � (I:i:8)
Whatsoever the mind
perceives in itself, or is the immediate object of perception, thought, or
understanding, I call idea; and the power to produce any idea in our
mind I call a quality of the subject wherein that power is. (II:viii:8)
���ideas become general, by separating
from them the circumstances of time and place, and any other ideas that may
determine them to this or that particular existence. By this way of abstraction they are made capable
of representing more individuals than one; each of which having in it a
conformity to that abstract idea� (Essay, III iii 11)
The use of words then being made to stand as
outward marks of our internal ideas, and those ideas being taken from
particular things, if every particular idea that we take in should have a
distinct name, names must be endless. To prevent this, the mind makes the
particular ideas received from the particular objects to become general; which
is done by considering them as they are in the mind such appearances, separate
from all other existences and the circumstances of real existence, as time,
place, or any other concomitant ideas. This is called abstraction
whereby ideas take from particular beings become general representatives of all
of the same kind, and their names general names, applicable to whatever exists
conformable to such abstract ideas. (II:xi:9)
�These I call original
or primary qualities of bodies . . . solidity, extension, figure, motion
or rest, and number.� (II:viii:9)
but these are not powers � rather �they�re intrinsic properties of things which may be the grounds or bases of powers, and they are �modifications of matter in the bodies�� (Mackie)
examples of secondary qualities: �colours, sounds, tastes etc.�
these are identified with powers � they are �nothing in the objects themselves, but [except] powers to produce various sensations in us by their primary qualities, i.e. by the bulk, figure, texture and motion of their insensible parts� (Locke)
this is often misread as saying that the secondary
qualities are not in the objects at all, only �in the mind� �s secondary
qualities are meant by Locke as the powers of things to produce ideas in our
minds, not the ideas themselves
No proposition [or
idea] can be said to be in the mind which it never yet knew, which it was never
yet conscious of. (I:ii:5)
It
would suffice to convince unprejudiced readers of the falseness of this
supposition [innate ideas] if I should only show . . . how men, barely by the
use of their natural faculties, may attain to all the knowledge they have
without the help of any innate impressions; and may arrive at certainty without
any such original notions and or principles. (I:ii:1)
Let
us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all characters,
without any ideas; how comes it to be furnished? .... To this I answer in one
word, from experience. (II:i:2)
The
great source of most of the ideas we have, depending wholly upon our senses,
and derived by them to the understanding, I call sensation. (II:i:3)
By
reflection . . . I would be understood to mean that notice the mind takes of
its own operations, and the manner of them. (II:i:4)
[I]t
is plain that the ideas that [perceived things] produce in the mind enter by
the senses simple and unmixed. (II:ii:1)
The mind [takes] notice how one [thing] comes to an end, and ceases to
be, and another begins to exist which was not before; . . . and [concludes]
from what it has constantly observed to have been, that the like changes will
for the future be made in the same things, by like agents, and by the like
ways, . . . and so comes by that idea we call power. (II:xxi:1)
[W]e have no such
clear idea at all, and therefore signify nothing by the word substance,
but only an uncertain supposition of we know not what, i.e., of something
whereof we have no particular and distinct positive idea, which we take to be
the substratum, or support, or those ideas we do know.
[Regarding external
existence] I have not that certainty of it that we strictly call knowledge;
though the great likelihood of it puts me past doubt, and it be reasonable for
me to do several things upon the confidence (IV:ix:9)
Lowe on Locke:
a criterion of application = �a principle determining to which individuals the general term in question is correctly applicable�
a criterion of identity = �a principle determining the conditions under which one individual to which the term is applicable is the same as another�
[It is] one thing
to be the same substance another to be the same man, and a third
to be the same person, if person, man and substance
are three names standing for different ideas; for such as is the idea belonging
to that name, such must be the identity (II:xxvii:7).
For
should the soul of a prince, carrying with it the consciousness of the prince's
past life, enter and inform the body of a cobbler . . . everyone sees he would
be the same person with the prince, accountable only for the prince's actions:
but who would say it's the same man. (II:xxvii: 15)
[A person]
is a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can
consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different places or
times, which it does only by that consciousness which is inseparable from
thinking . . . . (II: xvii:9)
I
say . . . our consciousness being interrupted and we losing the sight of our
past selves, doubts are raised whether we are the same thinking thing, i.e.,
the same substance or no. (II:xxvii: 10)
�we have an intuitive knowledge of our own existence, and an internal infallible perception that we are. In every act of sensation, reasoning, or thinking, we are conscious to ourselves of our own being; and, in this matter, come not short of the highest degree of certainty.� (IV:ix:3)
what person stands for; which, I think, is a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places; which it does only by that consciousness which is inseparable from thinking, and, as it seems to me, essential to it: It being impossible for any one to perceive, without perceiving that he does perceive. When we see, hear, smell, taste, feel, meditate, or will any thing, we know that we do so.
since consciousness always accompanies thinking, and it is that which makes every one to be what he calls self, and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking things; in this alone consists personal identity, i.e. the sameness of a rational being: And as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches the identity of that person; it is the same self now it was then; and it is by the same self with this present one that now reflects on it, that that action was done.
For as far as any intelligent being can repeat the idea of any past action with the same consciousness it had of it at first, and with the same consciousness it has of any present action: So far it is the same personal selfAnd to punish Socrates waking for what sleeping Socrates thought, and waking Socrates was never conscious of; would be no more of right, than to punish one twin for what his brother-twin did, whereof he knew nothing, because their outsides were so like, that they could not be distinguished; for such twins have been seen.
suppose I wholly lose the memory of some parts of my life beyond a possibility of retrieving them, so that perhaps I shall never be conscious of them againif it be possible for the same man to have distinct incommunicable consciousness at different times, it is past doubt the same man would at different times make different personshuman laws not punishing the mad man for the sober man's actions, nor the sober man for what the mad man did, thereby making them two personsWhy else is he punished for the fact he commits when drunk, though he be never afterwards conscious of it? Human laws punish both, with a justice suitable to their way of knowledge; because in these cases, they cannot distinguish certainly what is real, what counterfeitBut in the great day, wherein the secrets of all hearts shall be laid open, it may be reasonable to think, no one shall be made to answer for what he knows nothing of; but shall receive his doom, his conscience accusing or excusing him.
For whatsoever any substance has thought or done, which I cannot recollect, and by my consciousness make my own thought and action, it will no more belong to me, whether a part of me thought or did it, than if it had been thought or done by any other immaterial being anywhere existing.
Any thing united to it by a consciousness of former actions, makes also a part of the same self, which is the same both then and now
Person, as I take it, is the name for this self. Wherever a man finds what he calls himself, there I think another may say is the same person. It is a forensick term appropriating actions and their merit; and so belongs only to intelligent agents capable of a law, and happiness and misery. This personality extends itself beyond present existence to what is past, only by consciousness, whereby it becomes concerned and accountable, owns and imputes to itself past actions, just upon the same ground, and for the same reason that it does the present. All which is founded in a concern for happiness, the unavoidable concomitant of consciousnessFor supposing a man punished now for what he had done in another life, whereof he could be made to have no consciousness at all, what difference is there between that punishment and being created miserable?
"receive according to his doings, the secrets of all hearts shall be laid open." The sentence shall be justified by the consciousness all persons shall have, that they themselves, in what bodies soever they appear, or what substances soever that consciousness adheres to, are the same that committed those actions, and deserve that punishment for them.
The perception of ideas being (as I conceive) to the soul, what motion is to the body: Not its essence, but one of its operations. And therefore, though thinking be supposed never so much the proper action of the soul, yet it is not necessary to suppose that it should be always thinking, always in action
�I do not say there is no soul in a man, because he is not sensible of it in his sleep: But I do say, he cannot think at any time, waking or sleeping, without being sensible of it.
waking man, whereof the sleeping man is never conscious, has never the least perception. I ask then, whether Castor and Pollux, thus, with only one soul between them, which thinks and perceives in one what the other is never conscious of, nor is concerned for, are not two as distinct persons as Castor and Hercules, or as Socrates and Plato were?
For I suppose nobody will make identity of persons to consist in the soul's being united to the very same numerical particles of matter: For if that be necessary to identity, it will be impossible, in that constant flux of the particles of our bodies, that any man should be the same person two days, or two moments together.
To think often, and never to retain it so much as one moment, is a very useless sort of thinking
it is altogether as intelligible to say, that a body is extended without parts, as that any thing thinks without being conscious of it, or perceiving that it does so.
If they say, that a man is always conscious to himself of thinking, I ask, how they know it. Consciousness is the perception of what passes in a man's own mind.
�existence is percipi or percipere� but �the horse is in the stable, the Books are in the study as before�
"By matter
therefore we are to understand an inert, senseless substance, in which
extension, figure, and motion do actually subsist." (�9)
immaterialism: �gross misinterpretation�, �thinking reader�
There was a young man who said, "God
Must think it exceedingly
odd,
If he finds that this tree
continues to be,
when there's no one about in
the Quad.
REPLY
Dear Sir: Your astonishment's odd:
I am always about in the
Quad.
And that's why the tree
will continue to be,
Since observed by Yours
faithfully, GOD
But it seems that a
word becomes general by being made the sign, not of an abstract general idea,
but of several particular ideas. (�11)
Thus, for example,
a certain colour, taste, smell, figure, and consistence having been observed to
go together, are accounted on distinct thing, signified by the name apple.
(�1)
This perceiving,
active being is what I call mind, spirit, soul, or myself.
By which words I do not denote any one of my ideas but a thing entirely
distinct from them wherein they exist, or . . . whereby they are perceived; for
the existence of an idea consists in being perceived. (�2)
The table I write
on, I say, exists, that is, I see and feel it; and if I were out of my study I
should say it existed meaning that if I was in my study I might perceive it, or
that some other spirit actually does perceive it. (�3)
For as to what is
said of the absolute existence of unthinking things without any relation to
their being perceived, that seems perfectly unintelligible. Their esse is
percipi, nor is it possible they should have any existence out of the
minds of thinking things which perceive them. (�3)
But my conceiving
or imagining power does not extend beyond the possibility of real existence or
perception. Hence as it is impossible for me to see or feel anything without an
actual sensation of that thing, so is it impossible for me to conceive in my
thoughts any sensible thing lor object distinct from the sensation or
perception of it. (�5)
Hence it is plain
that the very notion of what is called matter, or corporeal substance,
involves a contradiction in it. (�9)
In short, let
anyone consider those arguments which are thought manifestly to prove that
colours and tastes exist only in the mind, and he shall find they may with
equal force be brought to prove the same thing of extension, figure, and
motion. (�10)
In short,
extension, figure, and motion, abstracted from all other qualities, are
inconceivable. Where therefore, the other sensible qualities are, there must
these be also, to wit in the mind and nowhere else. (�10)
Now why may we not
as well argue [as is for heat and cold] that figure and extension are not
patterns or resemblances of qualities existing in matter, because to the same
eye at different stations, or eyes of a different texture at the same station,
they appear various, and cannot therefore be images of anything settled and
determinate without the mind. (�14)
Hence it is evident
the supposition of external bodies is not necessary for the producing of our
ideas: since it is granted that they are produced sometimes, and might possibly
be produced always, in the same order we see them in at present. (�19)
But do you not
yourself perceive or think of them all the while? This therefore . . . does not
show that you can conceive it possible the objects of your thought may exist
without the mind: to make this out, it is necessary that you conceive them
existing unconceived or unthought of, which is a manifest repugnancy. (�23)
All our ideas . . .
are visibly inactive; there is nothing of power or agency included in them.
(�24)
[T]he cause of
ideas is an incorporeal active substance or spirit. (�26)
A spirit is one
simple, undivided, active being: as it perceived ideas, it is called the understanding,
and as it produces or otherwise operates about them, it is called the will.
(�27)
Such is the nature
of spirit, or that which acts, that it cannot be of itself perceived but only
by the effects which it produceth. (�27)
The ideas of sense
are more strong, lively, and distinct than those of the imagination; they have
likewise a steadiness order and coherence and are not excited at random, as
those which are the effects of human wills often are, but in a regular series,
the admirable connexion whereof sufficiently testifies the wisdom and
benevolence of its Author. (�30)
Now the set rules
or established methods wherein the Mind we depend on excites in us the ideas of
sense, are called the laws of nature; and these we learn by experience, which
teaches us that such and such ideas are attended with such and such other
ideas, in the ordinary course of things.. (�30)
That
the things I see with my eyes and touch with my hands do exist, really exist, I
make not the least question. The only thing whose existence we deny is that which
philosophers call Matter or corporeal substance. (�35)
[I]t
will be objected, that from the foregoing principles . . . things are every
moment annihilated and created anew. (�45)
[T]he
matter philosophers contend for is an incomprehensible somewhat, which hath
none of those particular qualities whereby the bodies falling under our senses
are distinguished one from another. (�47)
We
may not conclude that they have no existence, except only while they are
perceived by us, since there may be some other spirit that perceives them,
though we do not. (�48)
[T]he
absolute existence of unthinking things are words without a meaning, or which
include a contradiction. (�24)
There
is a rerum natura, and the distinction between realities and chimeras
retains its full force. . . . [B]ut then they both equally exist in the mind,
and in that sense they are alike ideas. (�34)
�When we run over libraries, persuaded of these principles, what havoc must we make? If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphyics, for instance; let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames, for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion�
Custom, then, is the great guide to human life
James on the infant: �a great, booming, buzzing confusion�
A wise man proportions his belief to the evidence
When I shut my eyes and think of my chamber the ideas I form are the exact representations of the impressions I felt; nor is there any circumstance of the one which is not in the other...ideas and impressions appear to always correspond to each other.
"Reason is...the slave of the passions." The understanding can rationalize any kind of conduct. "Enlightenment of the understanding makes more clever but not better."
�if we go any farther, and ascribe a power or necessary connexion to these objects; this is what we can never observe in them�
�all inferences from experience suppose, as their foundation, that the future will resemble the past ... If there be any suspicion that the course of nature may change, and that the past may be no rule for the future, all experience becomes useless, and can give rise to no inference or conclusion. It is impossible, therefore, that any arguments from experience can prove this resemblance of the past to the future; since all these arguments are founded on the supposition of that resemblance,� (Enquiry??? iv. ii. 32)
If we have observed that flame and heat 'have always been conjoined together', our expectation of heat is, he says, 'the necessary result' of seeing the flame. This expectation is 'a species of natural instincts, which no reasoning or process of the thought and understanding is able either to produce or to prevent' (ibid. v. i. 38).
There is no such idea as self. The so-called self proves to be a bundle or collection of different perceptions [...heat, cold, light...] which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement.
The great end of all human industry is the attainment of happiness. For this were arts invented, sciences cultivated, laws ordained, and societies modelled, by the most profound wisdom of patriots and legislators. Even the lonely savage, who lies exposed to the inclemency of the elements and the fury of wild beasts, forgets not, for a moment, this grand object of his being
�Behavior is all observable or
otherwise measurable muscular and secretory responses (or lack thereof) and
related phenomena in response to changes in an animal's internal or external
environment." (J.W. Grier and T. Burk, Biology of Animal Behavior,
1992)
�Communication occurs when one individual�s actions provide a signal that changes the behaviour of another individual�
�information� transmitted in the signal in terms of
the extent and delicacy with which one animal (the �signaller�) can influence
the behaviour of another (the �receiver�), or in terms of reduced uncertainty.
We can talk about �noise� in terms of attenuation, extraneous environmental
distractions and any deficiencies in the signaller�s encoding or receiver�s
decoding equipment that hamper or diminish the impact of the signal (Wiley 1983).
�Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law.�
�So act that you treat humanity, both in your own person and in the person of every other human being, never merely as a means, but always at the same time as an end.�
�Duty is the necessity of acting out of respect for the law�
the tree that has to grow with its roots in the mud
�To talk of intrinsic right + wrong is absolutely nonsensical: intrinsically, an injury, an oppression, an exploitation, an annihilation can be nothing wrong, in as much as life is essentially � something which functions by injuring, oppressing, exploiting, and annihilitating, and is absolutely incomprehensible without such a character� (Genealogy of morals, 2nd essay, section 11)
What is good? All that elevates the feeling of power, the will to power, the power itself in man.
What is bad? All that proceeds from weakness.
What is happiness? The feeling that power increases---that resistance is being overcome.
What is good? All that elevates the feeling of power, the will to power, the power itself in man.
What is bad? All that proceeds from weakness.
What is happiness? The feeling that power increases---that resistance is being overcome. (continued...)
Napoleon, the synthesis of brute and Superman.
The philosopher, as a man indispensable for tomorrow and the day after the morrow, has ever found himself, and has been obliged to find himself, in contradiction to the day in which he lives; his enemy has always been the ideal of his day
The Christian resolve to find the world evil and ugly has made the world evil and ugly.
to ask �what is the good for me?� is to ask how best I might live out the unity of a narrative embodied in a single life � in the narrative of a quest, which is always an education both as to the character of that which is sought and in self-knowledge
virtues = �those dispositions which will not only sustain practices and enable us to achieve the goods internal to practices, but which will also sustain us in the relevant kind of quest for the good, by enabling us to overcome the harms, dangers, temptations and distractions which we encounter, and which will furnish us with increasing self-knowledge and increasing knowledge of the good�
�Distrust everyone in whom the impulse to punish is powerful!� (Thus Spake Zarathustra)
"the capacity of the universe to generate organisms with minds capable of understanding the universe is itself somehow a fundamental feature of the universe." � Nagel, tLW, ch 7
�As the essence of ,Matter is Gravity, so, on the other hand, we may affirm that the substance, tile essence of Spirit is Freedom� (Lectures on the History of Philosophy)
Truth in philosophy means that concept and external reality correspond.
An idea is always a generalization, and generalization is a property of thinking. To generalize means to think.
Education is the art of making man ethical.
It is ambition enough to be employed as an under-laborer in clearing
the ground a little, and removing some of the rubbish that lies in the way of
knowledge
If we disbelieve everything because we cannot
certainly know all things we shall do . . . as wisely as he who would not use
his legs, but sit still and perish, because he had no wings to fly (I: i:5 )
I suspected [on the rationalist plan] we
began at the wrong end . . .. Thus . . . extending their enquiries beyond their
capacities, and letting their thoughts wander into those depths where they can
find no sure footing, it is no wonder that they raise questions and multiply
disputes . . . never coming to any clear resolution . . . (I:i:7)
He that in physic shall lay down fundamental
maxims, and, from thence drawing consequences and raising disputes, shall
reduce it into the regular form of a science, has indeed done something to
enlarge the art of talking and perhaps laid a foundation for endless disputes;
but if he hopes to bring men by such a system to the knowledge of . . . the
constitution, nature, signs, changes, and history of diseases . . . [he] takes
much [the same] course with him that should walk up and down in a thick wood,
overgrown with briars and thorns, with a design to take a view and draw a map
of the country. (241)
I thought the first step towards satisfying
the several enquiries the mind of man was very apt to run into was to take a
survey of our understandings, examine our own powers, and see to what things
they are adapted. (I:i:7)
[Newton] demonstrated several propositions,
which are so many new truths before unknown to the world, and are further
advances in mathematical knowledge: but, for the discover of these it was not
the general maxims "what is is"; or "the whole is bigger than a
part," or the like that helped him. (IV:vii:11)
[O]ur idea of sameness is not so settled and
clear as to deserve to be thought innate in us. (I:ii:4)
And if they . . . carry the notion of
excellency, greatness, or something extraordinary . . . the idea is likely to
sink the deeper, and spread the farther; especially if it be an idea . . .
naturally deducible from every part of our knowledge, as that of a God is.
(I:ii:9)
The better to understand the nature, manner, and
extent of our knowledge, one thing is carefully to be observed concerning the
ideas that we have; and that is, that some of them are simple and some complex.
(246)
[T]here is nothing that can be plainer to a
man than the clear and distinct perception he has of those simple ideas; which,
being each in itself uncompounded, contains in it nothing but one uniform
appearance or conception in the mind, and is not distinguishable into different
ideas. (II:ii:1)
I would have anyone try to fancy any taste
which had never affected his palate; or frame the idea of a scent he had never
smelt: And when he can do this, I will also conclude that a blind man hath
ideas of colours, and a deaf man true distinct notions of sounds. (II,ii,2)
The two great and principle actions of the
mind . . . that everyone who pleases may take notice of . . . in himself, are
these two: perception or thinking; and volition or willing.
(II:vi:2)
When the understanding is once stored with
these simple ideas it can, it has the power to repeat, compare, and unite them,
. . .and so can make at pleasure new complex ideas. (II:ii,2)
Thus the same colour,
being observed today in chalk or snow, which the mind yesterday received from
milk, it considers that appearance alone, makes it a representative of all that
kind; and having given it the name whiteness, it by that sound signifies
the same quantity wheresoever it be imagined or met with: And thus universals,
whether terms or ideas, are made." (II:xi:9)
It is the ordinary qualities observable in
iron, or a diamond, put together, that make the true complex idea of those
substances. (II:xxiii:3)
If anyone should be asked what is the
subject wherein colour or weight inheres, he would have nothing to say, but the
solid extended parts; and if he were demanded, what is it that solidity and
extension adhere in, he would not be in a much better case than the Indian . .
. who saying that the world was supported by a great elephant, was asked what the
elephant rested on; to which his answer was -- a great tortoise: but being
again pressed to know what gave support to the broad-backed tortoise, replied
-- something he knew not what. (II:xxiii:2)
The idea . . . to which we give the general
name substance [is] nothing but the supposed, but unknown, support of those
qualities we find existing, which we imagine cannot exist sine re substante,
without something to support them. (II:xxiii:2)
[W]e have as clear a notion of the substance
of spirit, as we have of body; the one being supposed to be (without knowing
what it is) the substratum of those simple ideas we have from without;
and the other supposed (with like ignorance of what it is) to be the substratum
to those operations we experiment in ourselves within. (II:xxiii:5)
The idea of a beginning of motion we have
only from reflection on what passes in ourselves, where we find by experience
that barely by willing it . . . we can move the parts of our bodies. (II:xxi:
4)
oops � deleted
In the next place,
man knows, by an intuitive certainty, that bare nothing can no more produce
any real being, than it can be equal to two right angles. (IV:ix:3)
If,
therefore, there is some real being, and that nonentity cannot produce any real
being, it is an evident demonstration, that from eternity there has been
something . . . . And that eternal being must be most powerful.
. . . This eternal source, then, of all being must also be the source and
original of all power; and so this eternal Being must be also the most
powerful. . . . And therefore God. (IV:x:6)
"Revelation
in matters where reason cannot judge, or but probably, ought to be hearkened
to. First, Whatever proposition is revealed, of whose truth our mind, by its
natural faculties and notions, cannot judge, that is purely matter of faith,
and above reason."
"Truth,
then, seems to me, in the proper import of the word, to signify nothing but the
joining or separating of Signs, as the Things signified by them do agree or
disagree one with another. The joining or separating of signs here meant, is
what by another name we call proposition. So that truth properly belongs only
to propositions: whereof there are two sorts, viz. mental and verbal; as there
are two sorts of signs commonly made use of, viz. ideas and words."
"Our
knowledge of our own existence is intuitive. As for our own existence, we
perceive it so plainly and so certainly, that it neither needs nor is capable
of any proof... I think, I reason, I feel pleasure and pain: can any of these
be more evident to me than my own existence?... For if I know I feel pain, it
is evident I have as certain perception of my own existence, as of the
existence of the pain I feel: or if I know I doubt, I have as certain perception
of the existence of the thing doubting, as of that thought which I call doubt.
Experience then convinces us, that we have an intuitive knowledge of our own
existence, and an internal infallible perception that we are. In every act of
sensation, reasoning, or thinking, we are conscious to ourselves of our own
being; and, in this matter, come not short of the highest degree of
certainty."
To
show, therefore, that we are capable of knowing, i.e. being certain that there
is a God, and how we may come by this certainty, I think we need go no further
than ourselves, and that undoubted knowledge we have of our own existence...
For man knows that he himself exists... If any one pretends to be so sceptical
as to deny his own existence, (for really to doubt of it is manifestly
impossible,) let him for me enjoy his beloved happiness of being nothing, until
hunger or some other pain convince him of the contrary... He knows also that
nothing cannot produce a being; therefore something must have existed from
eternity... Next, it is evident, that what had its being and beginning from
another, must also have all that which is in and belongs to its being from
another too. All the powers it has must be owing to and received from the same
source. This eternal source, then, of all being must also be the source and
original of all power; and so this eternal Being must be also the most
powerful... And most knowing. Again, a man finds in himself perception and
knowledge. We have then got one step further; and we are certain now that there
is not only some being, but some knowing, intelligent being in the world. There
was a time, then, when there was no knowing being, and when knowledge began to
be; or else there has been also a knowing being from eternity...And therefore
God."
"All
men are liable to error; and most men are, in many points, by passion or
interest, under temptation to it."
from
SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT
"Though
I have said above... That all men by Nature are equal, I cannot be supposed to
understand all sorts of Equality: Age or Virtue may give Men a just Precedency:
Excellency of Parts and Merit may place others above the common level: Birth
may subject some, and Alliance or Benefits others, to pay an Observance to
those to whom Nature, Gratitude or other Respects may have made it due; and yet
all this consists with the Equality which all men are in, in respect of
Jurisdiction or Dominion one over another, which was the Equality I there spoke
of... being that equal Right that every Man hath, to his natural Freedom,
without being subjected to the Will or Authority of any other Man."
"The
Legislative cannot transfer the Power of Making Laws to any other hands.
For it being but a delegated Power from the People, they who have it, cannot
pass it over to others. The People alone can appoint the Form of the
Commonwealth, which is by Constituting the Legislative, and appointing in whose
hands that shall be."
"...whenever
the Legislators endeavour to take away, and destroy the Property of the
People, or to reduce them to Slavery under Arbitrary Power, they put
themselves into a state of War with the People, who are thereupon absolved from
any farther Obedience ... [Power then] devolves to the People, who have a Right
to resume their original Liberty, and, by the Establishment of a new
Legislative (such as they shall think fit) provide for their own Safety and
Security, which is the end for which they are in Society."
from
A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION
"Now,
I appeal to the consciences of those that persecute, torment, destroy, and kill
other men upon pretence of religion, whether they do it out of friendship and
kindness towards them or no?... I say, if all this be done merely to make men
Christians and procure their salvation, why then do they suffer whoredom,
fraud, malice and such-like enormities, which (according to the Apostle)
manifestly relish of heathenish corruption, to predominate so much and abound
amongst their flocks and people?"
LOCKE'S THEORY OF
LANGUAGE
Words = meaningful sounds.
Meanings = ideas associated with words.
Communication involves ideas in me causing me to utter
the words that mean them which causes the same or similar ideas in you when you
hear them.
proper names
"George" refers via associated concrete idea to George, a
particular individual.
general terms
"Man"
refers via associated abstract idea to a whole set or class of
individuals
What I here make public . . . seemed to me to be
evidently true, and not unuseful to be known, particularly to those who are
tainted with scepticism, or want a demonstration of the existence and
immateriality of God, or the natural immortality of the soul. (Preface)
He must surely be either very weak, or very little
acquainted with the sciences, who shall reject a truth that is capable of demonstration,
for no other reason but because it is newly known and contrary to the
prejudices of mankind. (Preface)
And after this manner it is said we come to the
abstract idea of man, or if you please humanity or human nature; wherein . . .
there is included colour . . . but it can be neither white nor black, nor any
particular colour; because there is no one particular color whereof all men
partake. So likewise there is included stature, but then it is neither tall
stature nor low stature nor yet middle stature, but something abstracted from
all these. (�9)
Whether others have this wonderful faculty of
abstracting their ideas they best can tell: for myself I find indeed I have a
faculty of imagining or representing to myself the ideas of those particular things
I have perceived, and variously compounding and dividing them. . . . But then,
whatever hand or eye I imagine, it must have some particular shape and colour.
. . . I cannot by any effort of thought conceive the abstract idea [of an man]
above described. (�10)
I deny that I can . . . frame a general notion by
abstracting from particulars in the manner aforesaid. (�10)
And as that particular line [drawn by the geometer]
becomes general by being made a sign, so the name line, which taken
absolutely is particular, by being a sign is made general. (�12)
What more easy than for anyone to look a little
into his own thoughts, and there try whether he has, or can attain to have, an
idea that shall correspond with . . . the general idea of a triangle which is
neither oblique, nor rectangle, nor equilateral, epicrural, nor scalene, but
all and none of these at once? (�13)
[A] man may consider a figure merely as
triangular, without attending to the particular qualities of the angles, or
relations of the sides. So far he may abstract: but this will never prove that
he can frame an abstract general inconsistent idea of a triangle. (�16)
[I]t is not necessary. . . significant names
which stand for ideas should, every time they are used, excite in the
understanding the ideas they are made to stand for- in reading and discoursing,
names being for the most part used as letters are in Algebra, in which, though
a particular quantity be marked by each . . . it is not requisite that in every
step each letter suggest to your thoughts that particular quantity it was
appointed to stand for. (�19)
To discern the agreements or disagreements
that are between my ideas . . . there is nothing more requisite than an
attentive perception of what passes in my own understanding. (�22)
He who knows that words do not always stand
for ideas will spare himself the labor of looking for ideas where none are to
be had. (�24)